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Optimal Trade and Industria l Policy Under Oligopoly

ABSTRACT

In this paper we provide an integrati ve treatment of the welfare
effects of trade and industria l policy under oligopoly , and character ize
qualitativ ely the form that optimal intervent ion takes under a variety of
assumptio ns about the number of firms, their conjectur es about the response
· of their rivals to their actions, the substitut ability 9f tlieir products
·and the markets in which they are sold.

We find that when no domestic

, consumpti on occurs optimal policy under duopoly with a single home firm
depends on the differenc e between firms' actual responses to their rivals
and the response that their Fivals' conjectur e.
sistent, free trade is optimal.

If conjectur es are con

A tax or subsidy is indicated depending

on the sign of the difference .between the conjectur ed and the actual reponse.
With more than one home firm but still no domestic consumpti on, an export
tax is indicated if conjectur es are consisten t.

Productio n subsidies and

export tax-cum-s ubsidies can raise national welfare in the presence of
domestic consumpti on, because these policies can-mitig ate the extent of
the consumpti on distortion implicit in the deviation of price from marginal
cost.
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Optimal Trade and Industria l Policy Under Oligopoly *

I.

Introduct ion
Implicit in many arguments for intervent ionist trade or industria l

policy that have been advanced in the political realm appears to be an
assumptio n that internatio nal markets are oligopol istic.

It can be argued

that internatio nal competitio n among firms in many industrie s is in fact
imperfect ly competiti ve, either because the number of firms is few, because
p~oducts are different iated, or because governmen ts themselve s have car
telized the national firms engaged in competiti on.

They may do so implic

itly through tax policy, or explicitly through marketing arrangeme nts.
Government policies that affect the competiti veness of their firms in
internatio nal markets, as well as the welfare of their consumers , involve
not only tradition al trade policy (trade taxes and subsidies ) but policies

that affect other aspects of firms' costs, such as output tax and sub
sidies.

We refer to intervent ion of this sort as industria l policy.

Until recently the theory of commercia l policy has considere d the
implicatio ns of intervent ion under condition s of perfect competiti on or,
more rarely, pure monopoly.

As a consequen ce, this literatur e cannot respond

to many of the arguments that have been advanced in favor of activist govern
ment policies.

The only argument for departing from laissez faire is the

tradition al optimal tariff argument.

If (i) individua l firms and consumers

behave atomistic ally, (ii) the amount of trade that the economy engages in
is sufficien t to affect world prices, and (iii) the country's governmen t
can act as a Stackelbe rg leader in setting a trade tax before firms set
prices or quantitie s, then a departure from free trade is optimal from the
national perspecti ve.
trade remains optimal.

*

From a world welfar·e perspecti ve, however, free
Our purpose in this paper is to extend the theory

.
We are grateful to Jim Brander and
Avinash Dixit for helpful
discussio ns.
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of nationall y optimal policy to situation s in which individua l firms
exercise market power in world markets.
The primary implicatio ns of oligopoly for the design of trade policy
are (i) that economic profits are not driven to zero, and (ii) that a price
equal to marginal cost does not generally obtain.

The first of these

means that governmen t policies that shift the industry equilibriu m to the
advantage of domestic firms may be sociaily beneficia l from a national
perspecti ve.

The second feature of oligopoli stic competiti on suggests

that trade policy may be a substitut e for antitrust policy in an open
economy setting, if policies can be devised that effective ly shrink the
wedge between opportuni ty cost in productio n and marginal valuation to

consumers .
A number of recent papers have focused.· on the profit-sh ifting motive
for trade policy under oligopoly .

Brander and Spencer (1982a) develop a

. model in which one home firm and one foreign firm produce perfectly ·sub
stitutabl e goods, and compete in a third-cou ntry market.

They consider a

Cournot-N ash equilibriu m, and find that if the home country's governmen t
can credibly pre-comm it itself to pursue a particula r trade policy before
firms make productio n decisions (and if demand is not very convex), then
an export subsidy is optimal.1 Dixit (1984) has extended the BranderSpencer result to cases with more than two firms, and establish es that an
export subsidy in a Cournot oligopoly equilibriu m is optimal as long as

the number of domestic firms is not too large.

Finally, Krugman (1983)

shows that under increasin g returns to scale, protectio n of a local firm

in one market (e.g., by an import tariff).ca n shift the equilibriu m to
that firm's advantage in other markets by lowering its marginal cost of
productio n.

..
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These papers all provide examples in which interventionist trade
policy can raise national welfare in imperfectly competitive environments.
Yet each makes special assumptions about the form of oligopolistic com

petition, the substitutability of the goods produced and the markets in

which they are sold.

It is difficult to extract general principles for

trade policy from this. analysis. -Our purpose here is to provide an
integrative treatment of the welfare effects of trade and industrial policy
under oligopoly, and to characterize the form that optimal intervention
takes under a variety of assumptions about the number of firms, their
assumptions about rivals' responses to their actions (their conjectural
variations), the substitutability of their products and the countries where
they are sold •
The paper is organized as follows.

In the next section we consider

a general conjectural v.ariations model of a duopoly in which one home firm
competes with one foreign firm either in the foreign firm's local market
or in a third-country market.

We find that the sign of the optimal trade

or industrial policy (i.e. wheth_er a tax or subsidy is optimal) depends

on the relationship between the home firm's conjectural variations and the
actual equilibrium reactions of the foreign firm.

We note the form that

optimal policy takes in Cournot and Bertrand equilibria and in what Bresnahan
and Perry have called "consistent" conjectures equilibrium.

When conjectures

are consistent a policy of free trade is optimal.
In Section III we extend the analysis by expanding the number of firms

while maintaining the &ssumption of no domestic consumption.

Here we show

that free trade is optimal under consisten~ conjectures if there is only
one home firm, regardless of the number of foreign competitors.

If two or

more domestic firms compete in the foreign market, the optimal intervention
in a symmetric consistent conjectures equilibrium is always to tax production

- 4 -

or exports.
Finally, in Section IV, we return to the duopoly case, and introduce
domestic consumpti on.

In the special case of perfectly substitut able

products and consisten t conjectur al variation s on the part of the home
country· firm, the introduct ion of a small productio n subsidy by the home

country governmen t raises national welfare.

It does so by reducing the

price for the commodity faced by domestic consumers , thereby reducing the

differenc e between the marginal utility of consumpti on of the product and '
:·the cost of productio n, which is necessari ly positive under oligopol istic

·' competiti on.
mi

If, instead, trade intervent ion is considere d, then either

export tax or a subsidy may be indicated .
'"l'heuin findings of the paper are summarize d in a concludin g section.

II.

Optimal Trade Policy and the Role of Conjectur al Variation s:

The

Case of Duopoly
In this and subsequen t sections we character ize optimal governmen t
policy in the presence of oligopoli stic competiti on among domestic and
foreign firms in internatio nal markets.

Each firm produces a single pro

duct which may be a perfect or imperfect substitut e for the output of its
rivals.

We specify competitio n:~mong firms as Nash in output quantitie s
•

.2

with arbitrary conjectur al variation s.

The domestic governmen t can tax

(or subsidize ) the output of domestic firms~ tax (or subsidize ) the exports
of these firms, and tax (or subsidize ) the imports from the foreign rivals
of domestic firms.

Its objective is to maximize national welfare.

The governmen t acts as a Stackelbe rg leader vis-a-vis both domestic
and foreign firms in setting ad valorem tax (subsidy) rate~ . 3
set outputs taking tax and subsidy rates as given.

Thus firms

In other words, the
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government can pre-commit itself to a specific policy interventio n that
will not be altered even if it is sub-optimal .£.! post, once firms' outputs
are determined.

For simplicitly we assume the absence of government policy'

in other countries, although this assumption has no qualitative implication s
for our results.
In this section we consider optimal government policy when oligopolist ic
competition takes its simplest possible form:

a single domestic firm co~

petes with a single foreign firm in a foreign market.

In the absence of

domestic consumption government trade policy (export taxes and subsidies)
is equivalent to government industrial policy (output taxes and subsidies).
We assume that the government' s objective function places equal
weight on the home-firm's profit and government tax revenue.

Its objective

is therefore one of maximizing national product.
Denote the output (and exports) of the home firm by x and let c(x)
be its total production cost, c'(x) > O.

Upper case letters denote

correspondin g magnitudes for the foreign firm, with

C' (X) > O.

revenue of the home and foreign firms are given by the functions
and

R(x, X)

respectivel y.

-

Pretax
r(x, X)

These satisfy the conditions that

;)r(x, X) < O

ax

aR(x, X)
ax

<

O

These conditions state that an increase in the output of the competing pro
duct lowers the total revenue of each firm.

They are implied by the assump

tion that.the products are substitutes in consumption .

Total after-tax

.

'·
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profi ts of the home and foreig n firms are given by:

TT s

(1 - t) r(x, X) - c(x)

and

Il = R(x, X) - C(X)

respe ctive ly.

Here t denot es the ad valore m outpu t (or expor t) tax.

The

dome stic firm's conje cture about the foreig n firm's outpu
f respo nse to
chang es in its own outpu t is given by the param eter Y.
·

corres pondi ng conje ctura l varia tion is

The foreig n firm's

r.

The Nash equili brium quan tities , given the level
of home count ry

1>01icy interv entio n, are determ ined by the first- order
condi tions

(1)

Ri(x, X) + f~(x , X) - C'(X) = 0

(2)

We assum e that the secon d-ord er condi tions for profi t maxim
izatio n are
satis fied.
We now demo nstrat e:
Theore m 1:

A posit ive (nega tive) outpu t or ~xpor t tax can yield highe
r

natio nal welfa re than laisse z-fai re (t = 0) if the home
firm conje cture s a
foreig n chang e in outpu t in respo nse to an incre ase in
its own outpu t that
is small er (large r) than the actua l respo nse.
Proof :

Natio nal welfa re gener ated by the home firm is given by
w where

w = (1 - t)r(x , X) - c(x) + tr(x, X)
• r(x, X) - c(x)

(3)
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The change in welfare resulting from a small change in the tax (or subsidy)
rate tis

4

(4)

Substitut ing the first-ord er condition , (1), into (4), we obtain5

dw _ {- yr _ tc' ] (dx) + r (dXdt)
dt 2
1 - t dt
2

(5)

Expressio n (2) implicitl y defines the output of the foreign firm, X, as
a function of domestic output x.

Denote this function i/J(x).

The tax rate

t does not appear directly as an argument of this function, since t does not

appear in expressio n (2).

Therefore dX/dt = iµ' (x) (dx/dt).

Define.

g = (dX/dt)/(d x/dt) = ~'(x); the term g measures the slope of the foreign

firm's actual reaction to x.

A first-ord er condition for maximizin g national

welfare obtains when dw/dt = O, or, incorpora ting the definitio n of g into
equation (5)

-r (g - y) = tc'/(1 - t)
2

Since r

2

{6)

< 0, the left-hand and right-han d s:i,des of expressi.) n (6) are of the·

same sign if

1 > t >0

and

g > y,

or

t < 0

and

g < y.

The term

g - y is the differenc e between the actual response of X to a change in
x (i.e., 1jl' (x)) and the home firm's conjectur al varation.

When

can yield more income than laissez-f aire, conversel y when

g < y.

Q.E.D.

g >y a tax
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We now turn to some specific conjectural variations that are commonly
assumed in models of oligopolistic competition.

A. Cournot Conjectures
Under Cournot behavior, each firm conjectures that when it chan~es
its output the other firm will hold its output fixed.

Thus,

y= r =

')

in this case, and (6) becomes

- gr a::tc'/(1- t)
2

(7)

Totally differentiating the equilibrium conditions (1) and (2) to solve for
g this expression may be written:

tc'
1 - t

(u)

The second-order condition for the foreign firm's profit maximization
e~sures that the left-hand side of this expression has the sign of R

21

•

Letting t* denote the optimal export tax (or subsidy, if negative), we hav~
established
Proposition 1:

In a Cournot duopoly with no home consumption, sgn t* = sgn r.,., ..
.:.l

In th.e case of Cournot duopoly R .is the slope of the foreign firm's
21
reaction curve.

If R < 0, then an increase in home output causes the
21

foreign firm to reduce its output.

Linear demand necessarily implies

~l < 0, and many, but not all, specifications of demand imply this sign as
well.
Proposition 1 constitutes a slight generalization of the Brander
Spencer (1982a) argument for an export subsidy to situations in which the
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competing firms produce imperfect substitut es:

an export subsidy raises

domestic welfare in a Cournot eqttilibriu m by transferin g industry profit

to the domestic firm.

Graphical ly, the tax shifts the domestic reaction

curve so that it intersect s the foreign curve at the point that the home
firm would have chosen had the home firm been a Stackelbe rg leader.
In the case of Cournot conjectur es the home firm's conjectur e that the
foreign firm will not lower its output in response to its own quantity
increase is an overly pessimist ic one.

When

R < 0, the foreign firm's
21

actual reaction to such a deviation is to reduce output.

The home govern

ment, with its ability to pre-commi t itself to a tax on output before firms
determine their output levels, can take advantage of the differenc e between
the firm's conjectur e and the true response.

B.

Bertrand Conjectur es
In a Bertrand equilibriu m, each firm conjectur es that its rival will

hold its price fixed in response to any changes in it own price.

Define

the direct demand functions for the output of the home and foreign firms as
d(p, P) and D(p, P) respectiv ely.

The total profits of the two firms are

therefore

n(~, P) = (1 -t)pd(p, P) - c(d(p, P))

Il(p, P)

~

PD(p, P) - C(D(p, P)) .

Each firm sets its price to maximize its profit taking the other fit,n's
price as constant.

First-ord er condition s for a maximum imply

- 10 -

(9a)

(9b)

While the home firm conje cture s that the forei gn
firm will not chang e
its price in respo nse to a chang e in p, .the true
respo nse is given ,. from
diffe renti ating (9b), by

(10)

The secon d-ord er cond ition for the forei gn firm' s
prof it maxi mizat ion
impli es that the sign of expre sssio n (10) is the
same as that of ITZl. If
the two produ cts are subs titute s (i.e. dz > 0 and
n1 > 0) .and retur ns to
scale are non- incre asing (c" _:: 0, C" > 0) a posit
ive respo nse will emerge
unles s an incre ase in its riva l's price has a signi
fican tly nega tive effec t
on the slope of the demand curve facin g the home
firm. In the spec ial
cases of eithe r perfe ct subs titute s or linea r deman
ds a posit ive respo nse
nece ssari ly obtai ns. There is conse quen tly a presu
mptio n in the
case of comp etitio n betwe en produ cers of goods that
are subs titute s that
the Bertr and conje cture on the part of a firm that
is cutti ng its price
to expan d its sales is overl y optim istic.
The actua l and conje cture d price respo nses can be
trans lated into
quan tity respo nses by total ly diffe renti ating the
demand funct ions to
obtai n

...,
d2

.

Dz
...!

[::]
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The Bertrand conjectur e on the part of the home firm implies a conjectur ed
quantity response given by

y

c

dX I dx)
( dp
dp

I

..

dP = 0

•

D /d
1 l

(11)

.

The actual response is

(12)

The term g - y is positive as long as
to a price cut by cutting its price).
Propositi on 2:

rr21

> 0 (the foreign firm responds

Applying theorem 1 we conclude:

In a Bertrand duopoly with no home consumpti on sgn t* =

Presumpti on regarding the sign of the optilil;al trade intervent ion
when duopolist ic behavior is Bertrand is exactly the opposite of that in
the Cournot case; that is, an export,!! ! is generally required.
tion for this result is instructiv e.

The intui

When a firm holds a Bertrand conjectur e

its belief about its rival's reaction to its own output expansion is
typically overly optimisti c.

It conjectur es that the competito r will

respond to its own price cut (output' expansion ) by maintaini ng a constant
price, whereas for most demand and cost structure s (includin g the cases

of perfect substitut es and of linear demands) the equilibriu m response of
the competiti or is to ·1ower its price.
case.)

(Note the contrast with the Cournot

Thus, the governmen t can shift industry profit to the home firm

by forcing it to be less aggressiv e so as to take into account the true
slope of the foreign response curve, that is by taxing sales.

- 12 C.

Cons isten t Conje cture s
The final spec ial case we consi der is one in which
duop olist ic

behav ior is chara cteriz ed by cons isten t conje cture
s. A cons isten t con
jectu res equil ibriu m (CCE), as defin ed and analy zed
by Bresn ahan (1981 )
and Perry (1982 ), among othe rs,is one in which each
firm' s conje ctura l
varia tions are equal to the actua l equil ibriu m respo
nses of its rival s
that would resul t if that firm actua lly were to chang
e its outpu t by a
smal l amou nt. Bresn ahan (1981 , p. 942) argue s that
consi stenc y of con
jectu res is a reaso nable restr ictio n to place on
oligo polis tic behav ior
if exoge nous chang es in the mark et envir onme nt are
frequ ent enoug h to
allow firms to learn their riva l's true respo nses.
In our case, for
exam ple, chang es in trade polic y or in facto r price
s in one coun try would
shift a singl e firm' s react ion curve , and the locus
of new equi libri a
would provi de the firm with infor matio n abou t the
slope of its riva l's
react ion curve .
The slope of the forei gn react ion curve in our mode
l is given -by
(dX/ dt)/( dx/d t) = g. Thus, a cons isten t conje cture
s equil ibriu m is
defin ed by y = g. The follo wing prop ositio n follo
ws imme diate ly from
expre ssion (6): 6
Prop ositio n 3:

In a duopo ly with cons isten t conje cture s and no home

consu mptio n, t*

= O.

The optim ality of free trade under cons isten t co~je
cture s emerg es
becau se there exist s no shift of the home firm 's
react ion curve that can
trans fer indus try prof it to that firm, given the
respo nse of its rival .

***
The duopo ly exam ple with no home consu mptio n high
light s the prof it
shift ing motiv e for trade polic y inter venti on in
an impe rfect ly comp etitiv e

I
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market.

We have endowed the home governmen t with a strategic ally advan

tageous position in relation to firms by assigning it the role of a
Stackelbe rg leader in setting policy.

In such circumsta nces the home

governmen t can raise national product by shifting the duopoly equilibriu m
to exploit any deviation of the home firm's conjectur es from the actual
equilibriu m response of the foreign firm.

If the home firm is overly '

pessimist ic in its conjectur e about the reaction to an increase in its
own output an export subsidy raises income, while if its conjectur e is
too optimisti c an export tax raises income.

When conjectur es are act;.ually

"correct, " as they are in a consisten t conjectur es equilibriu m, then no
scope remains for shifting profit to the home firm by shifting its reac
tion function, and free trade is optimal from the national perspecti ve.

Ill.

Optimal Trade Policy:

The Case of Multi-Firm Oligooolv and

Consisten t Conjectur es
ln this section we extend our analysis by introduci ng more than two
firms.

For analytica l convenien ce we confine our attention to symmetric

configura tions.

We continue to assume throughou t this section that there

is no home country consumpti on of the outputs of the oligopoli stic industry.
Suppose there are n home firms and m foreign firms in the industry.
The profit of home firm i is

~

i

c

(1 -

i i 1
•.n+l
t )r (x, .•• , Xn , A
,

while a foreign firm earns

•• •

,

n+m

X

) -

C

i

i
(x ) •
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where t i denotes the output tax imposed on firm i.

The conjectur e of

firm i about the response of the jth firm's output to a change in its

own output is denoted Yij, j ; i, j = 1, ••• , n+m.
The home country national product derived from this industry is
n

w =

I
i=l

r

i

-

i
C

First-ord er condition s for profit maximizat ion are:

i i
(1 - t )ri -

C

i'

+

i

(1 - t )

n+m

L

ii"
J

r.y J = O;

j=l

(i = 1, •.. , n)

(13a)

:j#i
(j

= n+l, ••• ,

n+m)

(13b)

Imposing the symmetry assumptio n and totally different iating (13a)
and (13b) at ti= 0 (i = 1, ••• , n),we obtain

where A(r) is an rxr matrix with diagonal elements a and off-diago nal
elements 8, dx is an n-dimensi onal c_olunm vector with elements dxi, dX
is an m-dimensi onal column vector with elements dXj, dt(n) is an n-dimen
sional column vector with elements dti and O(m) is an m-dimens ional column
vector of O's.

We have defined: 7
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A -

- i•J •
an d y=_y

In consid ering an export tax we sett i

= t,

i

= 1,

••• , n.

Differ entiat ing home countr y nation al produc t with respec t to
the vector
tat t

e

O yields :

dw
dt

(n+m- l)y)(dx 2 /dt) + r 1 nm(dXn+l /dt)
2

1

2

1

·

-= nr (dx /dt ){(n-,1 )(1-y) + m[ dXn+l /dt - y)}
2
2

(15)

dx /dt

In this sectio n we focus on the case in which firms form conjec
tures
consis tently .

As we showed in sectio n II, when there is a single domes tic

firm and a single foreig n firm and conjec tures are consis tent,
nation al
welfar e is maximized under laisse z-fair e.

More genera lly, the direct ion

of depart ure from laisse z-fair e depend s upon the sign of the
differ ence
betwee n the actu~l and the conjec tured respon se of the foreig
n firm.

By

consid ering the case of consis tent conjec tures we can isolat e
the effect
of increa sing the number of firms on optima l policy .
Using (15), we are able to demon strate:
·Propo sition 4:

In a symme tric, oligop olistic , consis tent conjec tures

equili brium with n home firms, m foreig n firms, and no home consum
ption,
the optima l produc tion (expor t) tax is zero if n=l and positi ve
if n>l.
The proof of this propo sition is provid ed in the append ix.

It can

be unders tood intuit ively by noting that when conjec tures are
consis tent,

- 16 -

the profit-s hifting motive for governm ent interven tion disappe ars.

remains is the standard optimal -tariff prescrip tion.

What

Whenever there is

more than a single home country firm, each home firm ignores the pecuniar y'
externa lity it imposes on other domestic firms when it raises its output.
Priva~e incentiv es lead to socially excessiv e outputs, since home income

includes all home firm profits.

The governm ent can enforce the coopera tive

equilibr ium in which home firms act as a group to maximize the home
country 's total profit by taxing exports or sales.

This external i_ty does

not arise when there is only one home firm; consequ ently, free trade is
optimal in that case.
If home firms conjectu re that their rivals react less agressiv ely
than they actually do, as is often the case in Bertrand equilibr ium,
then the desirab ility of an output or export tax is enhanced .

Convers ely,

when domestic firms conjectu re response s that are more aggressi ve than
the actual ones, then either a tax or a subsidy may raise nationa l.produc t,
dependin g upon whether the national -market- power effect or the profit

shifting effect.o f the policy dominat es.

IV.

Trade and Industri al Policy in the Presence of Domestic Consump tion
Thus far we have ruled out domestic consump tion of the outputs of

the.olig opolist ic industry under conside ration.

This has allowed us to

focus on the profit-s hifting motive for trade policy.

However, by making

this assumpt ion, we have neglecte d a second way in which interve ntionist
trade or industr ial policy might yield welfare gain~ when markets are

imperfe ctly competi tive.

Since oligopo listic markets are generall y

characte rized by a differen ce between the price and margina l cost of a
product , there is a potentia l second- best role for trade and industr ial
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policy (in the absence of first-best antitrust policy) to reduce this
distortion.

When domestic consumption is positive, production taxes or subsidies
and export taxes or subsidies are no longer identical.

In this section

we will consider the welfare effects of both types of policies in the
duopoly model of Section II, recognizing that when there is more than
qne domestic firm, the national-market -power motive for taxation of
output or exports is always present.

In addition, in order to focus on

the considerations fqr trade and industrial policy introduced by the pre
sence of domestic consumption, we.shall examine only the consistent
conjectures duopoly. Recall that in this case free trade is optimal when
there is no domestic consumption.
To make our point as simply as possible, we assum:e that the duopolistic
competitors produce a single, homogeneous good.

We also assume perfect

arbitrage with zero transport costs, so that under a production tax or
subsidy consumers at home and abroad face the same price for the product.
In other words, firms cannot price discriminate by setting different prices
in different countries.

A.

Production Tax or Subsidy

.

..

Let p(r+-X) be the inverse world demand function and let home country
direct demand be h(p).

The corresponding foreign demand is H(p).

r

If

a production tax at rate tis imposed the profit of the domestic firm is

~

.

c

(1 - t)p(x + X)x - c(x).

Domestic tax revenue is tpx.

Consumer surplus at home is

p

h(q) dq.

Summing these gives total home country

welfare from producing, consuming and taxing the product:

8
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w. px -

C

+

r

h(q) dq

The change in home welfar e result ing from a small change in the
outpu; tax is

dw
( +
,
, )dx + , dX . dP
dt = p
xp - c dt
xp dt. - ~

Subst ituting the first-o rder condit ion for the home- firm's profit
maxim ization ,

this become s:

: : = {xp'(g - y)

+ t[p + xp'(l + Y)]} : : - h~

(16)

_F;~aluating (16) at t = 0, and imposi ng the condit ion that conjec
tures are
consis tent (g = y), we find

dw/dt = -hdp/d t.

The choice betwee n a pro

ductio n tax and a produ ction subsid y hinges on which policy would
lower
the price faced by domes tic consum ers, thereb y reduci ng the consum
ption
distor tion associ ated with imperf ect compe tition.
It is easy to calcul ate dp/dt = p'(dx + dX)/dt .

Applyi ng Crame r's

rule to the total differ ential s of the two firms' first-o rder
condit ions,
we have

d(x·+ X)
c'
= [ ( C' - p) X - C"]
dt
!:::.

(17)

where ~ is the determ inant of the 2x2 Jacobi an matrix , which
is assumed
to be positi ve for stabil ity.

If foreig n margin al cost is increa sing (C" > 0),

then p > C', and the right hand side of (17) is unamb iguous ly
negati ve.

- 19 -

A produc tion subsid y raises world outpu t, and hence lowers
world price.

Altern ativel y, if margin al costs at home and abroad are consta
nt ( c" = 0)
and C"-= 0), then the consis tent conjec tures equilib rium is the
Bertra nd
equili brium (see Bresna han, 1981), so that p = C' and d(x + X)/dt
= 0.
In this case the optima l indus trial policy is laisse z faire.
Propo sition 5:

In a homogenous produc t·duop oly with consis tent con-

jecutr es and non-ze ro domes tic consum ption,
(i)

if c" = 0 and C" = O, then t* = 0

"(ii)

B.

if C" > 0, then t* < 0

Export Tax or Subsid y
Finall y, we consid er the welfar e effect s of a small export tax

at rate T.

Under this policy domes tic consum ers pay a price p(l-1)

for the good, and home goyem ment revenu e is
invers e demand functi on is now writte n as
pl-= 1/{H'( p) + (1 - T)h'[p (l - T)]}

pT(x - h).

The world

p(x + X, 1), where

and

Procee ding as before , we find
dw
dT

I .
T=O

hp d (x + X) + P2_(x - h)
1
dT

In this case, howev er, it is no longer possib le to sign unamb
iguous ly
the effect of a small tax or subsid y on total world output .

In addi

tion, there is a second term that now enters the expres sion for
dw/dT,
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which at

T

= 0 is unambig uously positiv e or negativ e dependi ng upon

whethe r the home country is a net export er or importe r of the produc t.
Given total output , an export tax raises the world price of the export
since it subsidi zes

good

domest ic consum ption.

This standar d terms-o f

trade.e ffect favors an export tax or import tariff, just as it does when
the market is compet itive.
~o recapi tulate the argumen t of thjs section , either an export tax
or an export subsidy may raise domest ic welfare in a duopol istic market
with domest ic consum ption. · When conjec tures are cons.ist ent, any
profit

shiftin g motive for policy interve ntion is elimina ted.

What remains is a

standar d terms- of-trad e effect, and what might be termed a "consum ption
distort ion effect ," arising from the gap between price and margin al cost.
The former always indicat es an export tax or import tariff, while the
J.atter
may favor either a tax or a subsidy , depend ing on the precise forms of
the demand and cost functio ns.

V. Conclu sions
We have analyze d the weifare effects of trade policy and indust rial
policy (produ ction taxes and subsid ies) for a range of specifi cation s
of an
oligop olistic industr y.
policy emerge .

A number of genera l propos itions for optima l

First, either trade _policy or indust rial policy may raise

domest ic welfare if oligop olistic profits can be shifted to home country
firms.

Policie s that achieve this profit shiftin g can work only if the

governm ent is able to set its policy ir. advance of firms' produc tion
decisio ns, and if governm ent policy commitm ents are credib le.

Furthe r

more, in· the duopoly case profits can be shifted only if firms' conjec
utral
variati ons differ from the true equilib rium respons es that would result
if
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they were to alter their output levels.

The choice between a tax and a

subsidy in this case depends on whether firms' conjectures about their
rival's response are overly optimistic or overly pessimistic.
Second, whenever there is more than one domestic firm, competition
among them is detrimental to home country social welfare.

In

other words, there exists a pecuniary externality since each domestic
firm does not take into account the effect of its own actions on the profits
of other domestic competitors.

A production or export tax will lead

domestic firms to restrict their outputs, shifting them closer to the
level that would result with collusion.

In this familiar way a production

or export tax enables the home country to exploit its monopoly power in
trade fully.
Finally, when there is domestic consumption of the output of the
oligopolistic industry, there are two further motives for policy inter
vention.

First, consumers' marginal valuation of the product will generally

differ from domestic marginal cost of production due to the collective
exertion of monopoly power by firms in the industry.

A welfare improving

policy for this reason should increase domestic consumption.

When industrial

policy is used, a production subsidy will achieve this result, whereas the
appropriate trade policy instrument may be either an export (or import)
tax or an export (or import) subsidy.

Second, there is the usual

externality caused by the multiplicity of small domestic consumers, who
do not take into account the effect of their demands on world prices.
Industrial policy cannot be used to overcome this externality, but if the
country is a net exporter (importer) an export (import) tax will have a
favorable impact on the country's terms of trade.

The formulation of

optimal trade or industry policy requires the weighting of these various
influences.

- 22 -

Appendix

In this appendix we prove Proposit ion 4.

To do so, we first prove

the followin g lemma:
Lemma:

Let A(r) be an rxr matrix with diagonal elements a and other

elements B•. Let B(r) be the matrix formed by deleting the first row and
second.
column of . A(r+l).
.

B(a -

Proof:

Then .

S)

r-1

The proof is by inductio n.

r = l, since

IA (1) I

The formulae hold triviall y for

= a and . IB(l) I

=

B.

?fow suppose

(Al)

and

(A2)

Expandin g

IA(r)I

along its first row, we have

(A3)

Similarl y expandin g IB(r)I along its first row yields

(A4)
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Subst ituting (Al) and (A2) into (A3), we have

• (a - S)

~2

[a + 8(r - 2)cx8 - (r - 1)82 ]

= (ex - B) r-1 [ex+ (r-1)8 ]

A

simila r substi tution into (A4) yields

= 6(a - 6)

r-2

[a+ (r - 2)6 - (r - 1)8]

.. S(cx - 6) r-1·

Q.E.D.
We are now able to prove Propo sition 4, which we restat e here
for conven ience.
Propo sition 4:

In a symme tric, oligop olistic , consis tent conjec tures

equili brium with n home firms, m foreig n firms, and no home consum
ptio~,
the optima l produc tion (expor t) tax is zero if n=l and positi ve
if n > 1.
Proof

In the case of consis tent conjec tures firm i antici pates a respon se
on the part of firm j to an exogen ous change in its own output
that
corres ponds to its actual genera l equili brium respon se.

To genera te

an exogen ous change in xi consid er the effect of variat ion in
the tax
1
t on the output of firm i. Such a variat ion affect s only firm
i's

first-o rder condit ion for profit maxim ization , given output of
all
other firms.

The total respon se in the output of any other firm to the
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variation in ti derives solely from the variation it induces in. x 1 .
Therefore ,the consisten t conjectur e of firm i about firm j's response
to a change in its own output is given

y =

1
1
1
{ (d,_1 /dt ) / (dx /dt )

for

j = 1, ••• ' n j

(dXj/dti) /(dxi/dti)

for

j = n+l, .;., n+m

I i

where
dxi

- - = AIA(n+m-l )1/IA(n+m )I

dti

••• t

and

n; j,'i

k = n+l,

Consisten cy of conjectur es thus implies that

From· (14):

dt1+1
dt
1
dx
dt·

-•·

= -

n

I B(n+m-l)I /IA(n+m)I

t=O

t=O

.

Substitut ing these expressio ns into (15), and rearrangi ng terms, gives

dw

a:

dt
{AS)
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Applying the lemma proved above to ~xpressi on (A5) yields:

dw
dt

(A6)

Stabilit y of the market equilibr ium requires that the principl e
minors of A(n+m) alternat e in sign, the first one negative . 9 Therefo re,
2
a< 0, and
/3 > 0, which implies jal > IBI, and hence ~ - S < 0.
. positive
. .
+· is
. even an d is
. negative
Th ere f ore (a - S) (n+m-2) is
.
i"f nm

-i-'

othe~is e.

Similar ly, A(n+m-l) is the n+m-1 principl e minor of A(n+m),

which is positive if n+m is odd and negative otherwi se.
and, from the first-or der conditio n (13a),

Since r~ < 0

1'
A=~ /(1 - t) >·O,

we conclude that the right-ha nd side of (A6) is positive for n > 1.

Q.E.D.

I

!-,
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Footnotes
1.

In Spencer and Brander (1982), the authors study a two-stage game
in which a capacity or R&D investment is made at a stage prior to
production.

In such a setting, export subsidies and R&D subsidies

are each welfare improving if implemented separately, but an optimal

policy package involves an export subsidy and an R&D tax.

Brander

and Spencer (1982b) extend the basic argument for interventio n to

situations in which duopolistic competition takes place in the home
market.
2.

In such cases an import tariff is often beneficial.

Restricting attention to output rivalry entails no loss of generality,
however.

Kamien and Schwartz (1983) demonstrate that any conjectural

variations equilibrium (CVE) in quantities has a correspondi ng CVE

in prices.
3.

Analysis of government policy in internation al markets is typically
based on this assumption.

See, e.g., ;,Spencer and Brander (1982).

It may be justified by specifying the political process of establish
ing policy as time-consum ing and costly, or by endowing the govern
ment with a reputation for adhering to announced policy.
4.

The second-orde r condition for a maximum is satisfied locally as long
as (i) the home firm's first and second order conditions for profit
maximizatio n are satisfied and (ii) the foreign firm's actual
response to a change in x does not differ significant ly from the
response conjectured by the home firm.

5.

We henceforth drop the arguments of the revenue and cost functions
and their partial derivatives whene~er no confusion is created by
doing so.

The revenue functions and their partial derivatives

are understood to be evaluated at the equilibrium value of
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(x, X), while the cost functions and their derivatives are evaluated

at x or X, whichever is appropriate.
6.

The second-order condition for a social optimum is satisifed at
the free-trade equilibrium if the product-market equilibrium is
stable.

·1.

In a symmetric, free-trade equilibrium all firms produce the same
output, and all revenue and cost function are symmetric, so that,
for example, r

i

= r1,

i

= 1,

••• , n.

For notational simplicity

and with no loss of generality the following analysis is expressed
in terms of the output, revenue, and cost functions of the first
home firm and n+l'st foreign firm.
8.

We assume that this integral is bounded.

9.

For a discussion of the stability conditions for conjectural variations
models of oligopoly, see Seade (19~0).
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